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Little is known about the factors affecting pastoralists’ livestock vaccination
decisions. In this thesis, we use a novel survey-based dataset on pastoralists living in the
Ruaha landscape in Tanzania, and employ several econometric approaches to identify the
factors affecting pastoralists’ decision-making process about livestock vaccination when
disease occurrence and severity, vaccination and healthcare access costs and other related
variables are known. Results from binary choice models that account for excess zeros
indicate that socially and economically active households are more likely to vaccinate
their livestock. The results also identify positive marginal effects of illness incidence and
having wage earners and in the household on vaccination decisions. The results from
mixture models also find that these same variables significantly lower the pastoralist’s
probability of not vaccinating their livestock. Most notably, increased vaccination cost
significantly lowers the probability that pastoralists vaccinate any livestock, as well as the
number of vaccinated livestock. These findings have important policy implications
considering livestock health education, veterinary service infrastructure, and supply-side
management. (JEL codes: D13, D83, Q12, Q13, R28).
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Livestock production plays a crucial role in meeting global nutritional needs, accounts for
approximately 40 percent of agricultural GDP, and provides pathways out of poverty for
more than one billion people whose livelihoods depend upon livestock directly or
indirectly (McPeak et al. 2011; World Bank 2011). Livestock disease is a persistent
problem in many developing countries, and Tanzania is not an exception (Perry and
Sones 2009), with approximately 60 percent of family-owned livestock suffering from
some type of preventable disease like bovine and caprine pleuropneumonia, brucellosis,
or foot and mouth disease (Clifford et al. 2008; Covarrubias et al. 2012; Kivaria 2003).
Livestock diseases affect pastoralist households through multiple pathways: they
contribute to food and nutritional insecurity, loss of wealth and income, and, in the case
of zoonotic diseases, can lead to an increased disease burden for humans. Pastoralist
households, which rely heavily on livestock as a source of nutrition, store of wealth, and
for cultural status (Coppolillo et al. 2009; Hesse and MacGregor 2006; Lybbert et al.
2004), are particularly affected by livestock disease losses.

The likelihood and severity of livestock diseases influence household livelihoods
and the burden of losses is often high, especially for households in less developed rural
settings where veterinary services are limited (Allport et al. 2005). Preventive measures
like vaccination, commonly referred to as averting actions or decisions, can lower the
expected loss to disease (Mclnerney 1996). Pastoralists’ averting decisions are based on
risk preferences, but are likely also shaped by previous experience with disease infection
and loss. Their decision mechanism is a complex issue, and likely depends on various
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socio-economic and household behavioral factors. The literature on livestock keepers’
vaccination averting decisions is limited, especially for pastoralist households. In the
context of high exposure to livestock diseases (World Bank 2011), we empirically
analyze household survey data to identify the factors that likely affect pastoralist averting
actions to decrease the likelihood of future disease losses.

This thesis extends the literature on households’ averting decisions, incorporating
information on households’ livestock disease experience through two related aspects.
First, we use household survey data to examine the impacts of potential socio-economic
and behavioral factors of pastoralists’ averting decisions for livestock diseases, i.e.,
vaccination. In particular, we empirically test two major hypotheses. We test the
hypothesis that the vaccination decision and number of vaccinated livestock is positively
influenced by prior disease experience, i.e., illness incidence and livestock death in the
past twelve months. Another hypothesis relates to vaccination cost. We hypothesize that
higher vaccination cost negatively influences the vaccination decision. Second, based on
pre-survey qualitative observations and empirical findings, we conclude the thesis with a
few policy suggestions on ways to address barriers to vaccination.

Following traditional averting behavior frameworks such as Bontemps and
Nauges (2016), we assume that a pastoralist will choose to vaccinate their livestock if the
expected utility when vaccinating livestock is higher than the expected utility from not
vaccinating. As this decision to vaccinate or not is a latent representation of the relative
difference in utility, we use their binary vaccination decision to capture differences in
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relative expected utility. The decision depends on a variety of economic, community, and
behavioral variables. Therefore, in explaining the pastoralists’ averting behavior for
livestock diseases, we need to consider the role of disease experience and socio-economic
factors together with related social beliefs. We assume that the binary vaccination
decision and resulting number of vaccinated livestock are associated with previous
disease and loss, with the costs of vaccination and travel to access vaccination services,
the household head’s age and education level, and family and herd size, among other
variables. Additionally, we include a control variable for households’ social and
economic activity with households with at least one cell phone, a wage earner, and a
primary school-educated household head considered to be more socially and
economically active . Another categorical control variable representing diversified
sources of income is also included to identify the effect of wage income on vaccination
decisions. The empirical basis of the study is a household survey conducted in 2012 in
Pawaga and Idodi divisions bordering Ruaha National Park and community wildlife
management areas in Iringa region, Tanzania. We collected household-level data on
livestock disease and vaccination and related household and community characteristics
using a structured questionnaire to analyze factors influencing households’ averting
decisions through descriptive and econometric analyses.

We consider an averting decision model where pastoralists’ have a binary choice
variable that includes the decision to vaccinate or not vaccinate. Maximum likelihood
approaches, such as logit and probit estimators, are frequently used as the estimation
strategy to examine binary averting decisions. In logistic regression, maximum likelihood
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estimates can be biased when events are rare. As our binary decision variable consists of
few positive actions, we consider three variants of the logistic model that account for rare
events in the outcome variable. First, we consider an exact logistic regression model that
is appropriate for small samples with dichotomous covariates, but excluded from final
analysis as our sample size is considerably high for this estimation. Second, the King and
Zeng (2001) bias correction method of logistic estimation is employed. Finally, we use
the penalized maximum likelihood estimation procedure proposed by Firth (1993). While
another class of estimators, known as zero-truncated procedures, exists that produces
more robust estimates, we cannot implement this procedure as it is only suitable for large
datasets (n≥2000) with zero-truncated data.

We extend the analysis to estimate a count data model where the number of
vaccinated livestock is considered as the outcome variable. Most households did not
administer any vaccinations, and therefore had zero vaccinated livestock. This is due to
the presence of both true and excess zeros. There is also a considerable gap between
observed zeros (89.29%) and predicted zeros (30% using a Poisson analysis). Moreover,
the distribution of non-zero counts (10.71%) shows dispersion with a possibility of over
dispersion. In this case, both hurdle and zero-inflated models (with or without over
dispersion) can explain the high occurrence of zeros in the outcome variable. The hurdle
model assumes a two-step decision-making process and expects a positive number of
vaccinated livestock if and only if the household decides to vaccinate. The reason behind
this zero in the count outcome variable is structural and depends on the binary first-step
vaccination decision. On the other hand, zero-inflated or zero-altered models assume that
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some pastoralists either do not know about vaccination or do not have the financial ability
to vaccinate, which inflates the number of ‘excess’ zeros. Households that have
vaccination knowledge and financial ability to vaccinate generate non-zero count values
when they choose to vaccinate. Their counterparts are unable to vaccinate due to financial
constraints and generate zero count values even though they may want to vaccinate their
livestock. The latter leads to ‘true’ zeros. Therefore, we need to consider a few variants of
the hurdle and zero-inflated models—for example negative binomial and Poisson—to
explain true zeros and excess zeros with or without over dispersed count data
simultaneously. We find that negative binomial-logit hurdle (NBLH) and zero-inflated
negative binomial (ZINB) models are the most robust techniques to analyze the number
of vaccinated livestock based on the Vuong (1989) test, Greene (2012) likelihood ratio
test, and various information criteria.

Descriptive analyses provide a summary overview of the livestock vaccination
status of three ethnic groups who faced disease in their livestock herds and consequent
livestock deaths in the twelve months prior to the survey (see table 2 for details). Even
though 49.74 percent of pastoralist households have experienced livestock deaths, only
10.71 percent vaccinated their livestock in the study areas. A higher percentage of the
households experiencing livestock disease—compared to households not experiencing
disease—vaccinated their livestock, which is uniform across the ethnic groups. A Pearson
chi-square test confirms that the difference is not significant among the ethnic groups.
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We compare and contrast the findings revealed from the maximum likelihood,
hurdle and zero-inflated estimations. Results from zero-inflated models, which explain
excess zeros based on household types, indicate that pastoralist households that are
socially and economically active, have at least one wage earner , and that are far from
the nearest livestock extension officer are less likely than their counterparts to be in the
excess zeros group. Additionally, households that experienced livestock illness are less
likely to be in the excess zero group. Households facing higher vaccination costs, on the
other hand, are more likely to be in the excess zero group. Both maximum likelihood and
hurdle models estimate the binary choice of vaccination decision. Results indicate that
households who are more socially and economically active and have wage earners are
more likely decide to vaccinate their livestock. Pastoralists are more likely decide to
vaccinate their livestock if the vaccination cost is low. We also find that higher per capita
livestock negatively influences the vaccination decision, suggesting that the more
livestock a household owns, the lower the probability that the household vaccinates their
livestock. It seems a little bit surprising but not without plausible explanations. Given that
pastoralists hold most of their wealth in their livestock, this finding may result from
diminishing marginal utility of wealth or changing risk preferences. Pastoralists with
more livestock have more options and can either sell or eat the animals at home to cope
with the disease occurrence without significantly affecting the sustainability of their herd.
The number of ill livestock in the past 12 months, wage earnings and vaccination cost
also influence the number of vaccinated livestock positively. A household head older
than 30 years of age vaccinated more livestock than their younger counterparts.
Additionally, socially and economically active households have more vaccinated
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livestock than those that are not. Households who experience more livestock deaths due
to illness vaccinate fewer livestock. In most cases, we find similar results for separate
data specifications in terms of ethnic groups, except Barabaig. Results from the hurdle
and zero-inflated models using the pooled data reveal a similar pattern and magnitude.

The rest of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 provides overview of pastoralism in
Tanzania with a brief literature review. Chapter 3 explains the conceptual framework of
pastoralists’ averting decision, and resulting output in view of livestock diseases
experienced in the past twelve months. Chapter 4 explains the sampling and survey
design for data collection and the econometric estimation strategies. Chapter 5 discusses
the empirical results and discussions with robustness checks. In the last chapter of the
thesis, we conclude with a few policy suggestions based on the major findings.
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CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW AND RELATED LITERATURE
Pastoralism in Tanzania has a long tradition where more than 30% of the land is either
pasture-friendly arid or semi-arid land (Fratkin 2001). Over the last few decades, many
African pastoral systems have been transformed with increasing agriculture-based
development policies, loss of pasture land, and the alteration of communal property
system. Only a small portion are now actively oriented with pastoralism as their major
economic activity. According to Sandford (2006), the future of pastoralism will be
influenced by increasing human populations and decreasing livestock production as well
as pastoralists’ adaptive capacity to respond to these challenges. In addition to trying to
maintain their traditional occupation, pastoralists face a high burden of livestock diseases
in this region, which may be increased by climate change (Gustafson et al. 2015).
Pastoralists in this area have already experienced the devastating impact of disease on
livestock herd production and health. Though traditional and modern preventive options,
e.g. vaccination, are available in some areas that are not sufficient enough. Moreover,
related socio-economic variables actively influence pastoralist’s decision making process.
From this perspective, both policy analyst and pastoralist need to understand the socioeconomic and behavioral factors of averting decisions, i.e. livestock vaccination, to
reveal potential policy implications of practices including livestock health education,
veterinary service infrastructure, and supply-side management.

Empirical exercises on household’s averting decisions in general and factors
affect the decision making process, in particular, have a long tradition in economics,
especially in risk perception, decision under uncertainty, and valuation. The potential
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significance of this averting decisions to livestock vaccination has been well documented
in the prior literature. Various theories have been put forward to explain the household’s
decision to take averting action. First of all, large theoretical works on the averting
behavioral model began with the notion that an individual agent tries to minimize the risk
of loss due to a specific reason. The averting behavior model can estimate the value of
preventing diseases considering any action or expenditures that individuals undertake to
avoid any undesirable outcome, for example, livestock illness or death. In contrast,
theories of the cost of illness consider only the value of cure from livestock diseases with
various direct and indirect costs. Related works on averting action or cost incurred to
avoid livestock disease risks has provided insights about the theoretical frameworks on
this behavior (Alberini and Krupnick 2000; Bontemps and Nauges 2016; Cropper et al.
2004; Guh et al. 2008; Mclnerney 1996). In addition, both ex-ante and ex-post measures
are used where ex-ante estimates prospective costs and ex-post estimates costs of an
action that have already happened.

Secondly, there are numerous empirical contributions that investigate socioeconomic and demographic factors that affect the decision making process. Some of the
studies analyzed impact of risk perception on averting decision models. Other studies
employed actual risk components, e.g. intensity, severity, and exposure, to understand the
averting decision. While some literature studies evaluate actual averting expenditure,
measuring willingness to pay is commonly used. Recently, averting decision-type models
explicitly consider a household’s beliefs and an individual’s behavioral factors to explain
the cognitive side of the decision making process. These commonly include a
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household’s beliefs on particular actions, or sometimes social learning. Some studies also
estimate stated and revealed behavioral data to check the predictive validity of actual
behavior.

This thesis is also related to the literature on the ex-post analysis of behavioral
risk analysis (Clemen and Winkler 1999; Goldstein et al. 2004). It is closely related to the
studies on technology adoption in agriculture (Adesina and Zinnah 1993; Just and
Zilberman 1988; Khanna, Khanna and Zilberman 1997), and benefit-cost analysis
decision framework for disease management (Nas 1996; Shwiff et al. 2013). This thesis
also contributes the growing literature on averting decision and expenditure models under
risks (Bontemps and Nauges 2016; Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre 2010). Since
vaccination decision considers socioeconomic and cognitive factors, our results also
contribute to the role of averting expenditure and other behavioral factors in determining
vaccination decision.

The importance of ex-post analysis of averting decisions to reconcile the
empirical evidence in the context of livestock diseases suggests two important
components of pastoralists’ decision making processes and consequences. The first
concerns the decision making process of a rural pastoralist household in Tanzania.
Regarding our empirical exercise, first we focus on cases where actions are recorded as a
discrete variable and the averting decision is a binary choice. The second concern is
about the estimation process where we use ex-post disease information and averting
expenditure information instead of ex-post willingness to pay data. In the study, the
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pastoralist household, rather than an individual, is the unit of analysis in this averting
decision model, where the household head with all active members would be responsible
for livestock vaccination. The primary objective of this article is to use field-level survey
data to understand determinants of averting behavior (vaccination). We then examine the
influences of these same factors in determining the number of vaccinated livestock.

17

CHAPTER 3: A SIMPLE FRAMEWORK OF PASTORALISTS’ LIVESTOCK
VACCINATION
In the study area, most of the pastoralists have experienced disease-related livestock
losses due to different types of diseases, for example, bovine and caprine
pleuropneumonia, brucellosis, and foot and mouth disease in the past twelve months. For
pastoralists in diverse areas of the world, livestock are an important source of food,
wealth, and social status (Lybbert et al. 2004). Mdoe and Mnenwa (2007) and Ouma et
al. (2006) also indicate that larger livestock herds bestow prestige upon households in
Tanzania. Given the substantial benefits that households derive from livestock, livestock
health is important for household wellbeing. In this view, vaccination is one way for
pastoralists to safeguard their herd so that they can maintain their food supply (e.g., meat,
milk), wealth, and social prestige (Chilonda and Van Huylenbroeck, 2001; Lybbert et al.
2004). One option for livestock disease control involves vaccination to reduce the
probability of infection and loss. We further assume that the pastoralists’ decision rule is
based on maximizing their expected utility by using vaccination to minimize the expected
loss due to disease (Wolf 2013).

Maximization of expected utility compares two decisions: vaccinate, 𝑣, and not
vaccinate, 𝑛𝑣. Consider a pastoralist who chooses to vaccinate if her expected utility of
vaccinating, 𝐸𝑈𝑣 , is higher than the expected utility of not vaccinating, (𝐸𝑈𝑛𝑣 ): 𝐸𝑈 ∗ =
𝐸𝑈𝑣 − 𝐸𝑈𝑛𝑣 > 0, where the utility difference, 𝐸𝑈 ∗ , is a latent variable. As all attributes
that affect preferences cannot be observed, we consider an observable component of
utility, 𝑍𝑖 where 𝐸𝑈𝑖 ∗ = 𝑍𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 . We assume 𝑍𝑖 is linear in the parameters, 𝑋𝑖 𝛽. Thus
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𝐸𝑈𝑣 = 𝑍𝑣 + 𝑒𝑣 = 𝑋𝑣 𝛽 + 𝑒𝑣 and 𝐸𝑈𝑛𝑣 = 𝑍𝑛𝑣 + 𝑒𝑛𝑣 = 𝑋𝑛𝑣 𝛽 + 𝑒𝑛𝑣 , where 𝑋𝑖 is the
observable component that affects the pastoralists’ averting (vaccination) decision, 𝐷𝑣 .
Rewriting the previous expected utility function as 𝐸𝑈 ∗ = 𝐸𝑈𝑣 − 𝐸𝑈𝑛𝑣 =
𝑋 ′ (𝛽𝑣 − 𝛽𝑛𝑣 ) + (𝑒𝑣 − 𝑒𝑛𝑣 ), where 𝐸𝑈 ∗ is not observed, but we can observe the averting
decision. In this case, McFadden (1973) suggested the random utility function for
separable decision analysis, which models a binary choice variable, where 𝐷𝑣 = 1 if the
pastoralists vaccinate their livestock, or 𝐷𝑣 = 0 if not. This specification can be estimated
through the following form:

(1)

𝐷𝑣 = 𝑋 ′ 𝛽 + 𝑒

As the pastoralists’ vaccination decision is a sequential, two-stage process, after
deciding to vaccinate or not to vaccinate, they decide how many livestock to
vaccinate, 𝑉𝑙𝑠 . Based on equation (1) we can write the following:

(2)
{

𝑉𝑙𝑠 =

≥ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑣 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 (𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑏𝑦 ′𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜′ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡)
= 0 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑣 = 𝑁𝑜 (𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑏𝑦 ′𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜′ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡)

Pastoralists who are not concerned about vaccination decide not to vaccinate, with
a number of vaccinated livestock always equal to zero. This type of pastoralist generates
‘excess’ zeros. Other households desire to have positive numbers of vaccinated livestock,
but some may have zeros due to several potential constraints, such as a lack of financial
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ability to pay for vaccination; these observations are known as ‘true’ zeros. In this
respect, modeling true and excess zeros is essential to explain all potential situations.
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODOLOGY
4.1 Sampling and Survey Design
The empirical basis of this thesis is a pastoralist household survey conducted in 2012 in
Pawaga and Idodi divisions near Ruaha National Park and community wildlife
management areas of Iringa region, Tanzania (Figure 2) as part of a larger, long-term
study on pastoralist households (Gustafson et al. 2015). As the Iringa Rural district has a
large population of pastoralists (NBS 2013) who face a considerable livestock disease
threat to heard health and household livelihoods, we selected this area for a field survey
to investigate the factors associated with livestock diseases and household vaccination
decisions. A two-stage stratified random sampling approach was employed to select the
pastoralist households from Pawaga and Idodi divisions. The sampling framework
includes ‘village’ as a primary sampling unit, and ‘household’ as the ultimate sampling
unit. We randomly selected 196 households from 21 villages to collect necessary
information.

A structured questionnaire was employed to collect pastoralists’ household
information. We collected data on herd size, livestock vaccination status, herd-level
morbidity and mortality data collected by livestock disease signs, and variables that
influence the vaccination decision, e.g., vaccination cost, distance to livestock extension
officer, and non-livestock sources of income. In addition, information related to
household size and residents, and geographical and community characteristics were
collected to assess the vaccination status of the study area. We grouped all the households
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into three different strata based on ethnicity as a post-stratification procedure to capture
any potential differences among the ethnicities.

4.2 Estimation Strategy
We use a two-stage estimation strategy to examine the factors affecting households’
decision-making processes and outcomes. We analyze the effects of socio-economic,
behavioral, demographic and group variables on pastoralists’ binary averting decision
and the number of livestock vaccinated. Finally, we employ various robustness checks to
examine the consistency of the estimated results.

According to equation (2), the decision variable is a binary output where 𝐷 = 1 if
the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ household vaccinates their livestock, and 𝐷 = 0 if they do not. This binary
decision outcome can be modeled using various econometric estimations. Variants of
maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs), such as the probit, are frequently used technique
to model binary dependent variables. In addition, logistic regression, another variant of
MLE is consistent, but only unbiased for large sample sizes; that is, estimates can be
biased when sample size is small. Pre-estimation descriptive statistics on survey data
reveals that 21 out of 196 (10.71% of total) respondents reported vaccinating livestock.
As our binary decision variable consists of very few positive responses, we consider three
different logistic approaches that account for rare events in the dependent variable. First,
we consider an exact logistic regression model that is appropriate when the dependent
variable is binary and sample size is small. As our sample size is around 200, and the
number of degrees of freedom of the regression model is high, we don’t report these
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results. Second, we employ King and Zeng’s (2001) bias correction method for logistic
estimation, which incorporates the probability of rare events. Finally, we use the
penalized maximum likelihood procedure proposed by Firth (1993) to reduce smallsample bias in maximum likelihood estimation. Firth’s method is an alternative to the
exact logistic regression method when there are rare events (Heinze and Schemper 2002).
We also estimate the marginal effects of the covariate, which is the expected
instantaneous rate of change in the outcome variable as a function of a marginal change
in that covariate, holding all other covariates in the model constant. Then, we compare
the marginal effects and related model fit statistics (see Table 4) of four MLEs of
pastoralists’ averting decisions. We do not consider any variants of zero-truncated
techniques because they predict zero counts even though there are no zeros in the
outcome variable. Most notably, this estimation procedure is only recommended for large
datasets.

The second part of the econometric estimation examines the impacts of the same
set of regressors on the number of vaccinated livestock as the second sequence of
pastoralist’s averting decision making (vaccination). For this purpose, we consider the
proportion of zeros in the outcome variable and the distribution of nonzero counts. Since
the outcome variable has many zero observations, it may be that ‘true’ zeros—
pastoralists’ choices not to vaccinate made after weighing the costs and benefits of
vaccinating—are conflated with ‘excess’ zeros, which reflect households that would
never consider vaccinating. Preliminary descriptive statistics find a considerable overdispersion in the outcome variable where the variance of the number of vaccinated
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livestock is quite high relative to its mean. Following Cameron and Trivedi (2009), we
also test the null hypothesis of equidispersion through auxiliary regression, and find some
evidence of overdispersion, though it is not statistically significant. There is also a
considerable gap between observed zeros (89.29%) and predicted zeros (30%) through
Poisson analysis. In this case, both Hurdle and zero-inflated models with or without
overdispersion are suitable to explain the high occurrence of zero in the observed
outcome variable.

The reason behind excessive ‘zero’ observations in count data models is generally
explained by two separate views. If we consider the averting decision-making process as
a two-step, sequential process, the ‘hurdle’ model can better explain the decision tree and
the outcome data. The hurdle model is “a modified count model in which the two
processes generating the zeros and the positives (count data) are not constrained to be the
same” (Cameron and Trivedi 1998, pp. 137). The hurdle model assumes that all zero
observations are from one structural source. In this case, we assume that only concerned
pastoralists (due to disease information) vaccinate livestock, and their counterparts do not
consider vaccinating their livestock. Hence, the zero observations arise only from the
unconcerned pastoralist. Symbolically,

(3) 𝐸(𝑙𝑠𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 ) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∗ 0 +
⏟
𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

𝑃𝑟(𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒)
∗1
⏟
𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

Letting 𝑙𝑠 be the number of vaccinated livestock by the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ household where
𝑃𝑟(𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒) presents the probability that 𝑖 𝑡ℎ household will exist in the zero-
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vaccination state, and 𝑃𝑟(𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒) turns into the probability for nonzero (count)vaccination state. Assume that 𝑃𝑟(𝑙𝑠𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 = 0) = 𝜑 and 𝑃𝑟(𝑙𝑠𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 1) =
1−𝜑

𝜆𝑥𝑖 𝑒 −𝜆

(1−𝑒 −𝜆 )(

𝑥𝑖 !

), where 𝜆 is a truncated Poisson distribution. On the other hand, standard

zero-inflated count data models assume that the zero observations are generated from
both structural and sampling sources. In this context, separate examinations for true zeros
and excess zeros are essential for predicting count observations, and to predict
membership in the excess zero group.

Zero-inflated models are generally a finite mixture model, the first part predicts
the excess zeros in ‘always zero’ pastoralist group, and second part of which predicts the
number of vaccinated livestock in ‘not always zero’ pastoralist group. Across the study
area in Tanzania, we find most of the households have zero vaccinated livestock, which is
due to the presence of both true (generated by ‘not always zero’ group of pastoralist) and
excess zeros (generated by ‘always zero’ group of pastoralist).

(4) 𝐸(𝑙𝑠𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 ) = ⏟
𝑃𝑟(𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∗ 0 + ⏟
𝑃𝑟(𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∗ 𝐸(𝑙𝑠 = 𝑥|𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒)
𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜

𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜

The plausible reasons for having true zeros due to deciding not to vaccinate, are
basically two-fold: i) either they prefer alternative uses of the infected livestock, e.g.,
eating the meat in the household, or selling the livestock to others; or ii) any other
financial and geographical constraints limit vaccination, e.g. distance to vaccination
services or low availability or high costs of vaccines. In some cases, both reasons may
contribute. Therefore, we consider variants of the negative binomial model, which
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includes Poisson, zero-inflated Poisson and zero-inflated negative binomial to correct for
the excess zeros and over-dispersion problem simultaneously (Lambert 1992).

Though the response variable (figure 1) shows a Poisson distribution with inflated
zeros, we cannot consider the basic Poisson regression model as this model assumes
equality between mean and variance. As the data contain significant numbers of
households choosing not to vaccinate, comprising both true and excess zeros, some
variant of the zero-inflated model, such as zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) and
zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) estimation, are typically employed to correct the excess zeros
and over-dispersion problem. All zero-inflated models consider two possible data
generating processes. The first process with probability 𝜑𝑖 generates only zero counts,
whereas the second process with probability 1 − 𝜑𝑖 generates positive counts from either
a Poisson or negative binomial model. Specifically,
𝑜 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝜑𝑖
𝑙𝑠𝑖 ~ {
where the probability of 𝑔(𝑙𝑠𝑖 |𝑥𝑖 ) is the
𝑔(𝑙𝑠𝑖 |𝑥𝑖 )𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 1 − 𝜑𝑖
following:

(5) 𝑃𝑟(𝐿𝑆𝑖 = 𝑙𝑠𝑖 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖 ) = {

𝜑(𝛾 ′ 𝑍𝑖 ) + {1 − 𝜑(𝛾 ′ 𝑍𝑖 )}𝑔(0|𝑥𝑖 ) 𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑠𝑖 = 0
{1 − 𝜑(𝛾 ′ 𝑍𝑖 )}𝑔(𝑙𝑠𝑖 |𝑥𝑖 )
𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑠𝑖 > 1

Here 𝛾 is the vector of zero-inflated coefficients to be estimated, and 𝑍𝑖′ is the
vector of zero-inflated covariates. Theoretically, the negative binomial (NB) incorporates
the general Poisson model, whereas the ZINB model incorporates the ZIP model. The
ZINB (ZIP) model consists of two separate models, a negative binomial (Poisson) model
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to predict the count data and the logit or probit model to predict the excess zeros. Then it
combines both models by adjusting the probabilities of count information in the Poisson
regression for observations that are true zeros. For our purpose, a logit model is employed
to predict pastoralists’ vaccinated livestock data for true zeros. After that, a negative
binomial (Poisson) model is generated to predict excess zeros.

Considering the descriptive features of the dataset, we estimate two different
models and use post-estimation tests to determine which fits the data better. Significant ztest statistics from the Vuong (1989) test reveals that either the ZINB or ZIP model
would be preferred to the standard negative binomial model. However, a significant
likelihood ratio test between ZINB versus ZIP models proposed by Greene (2012) reveals
that data are over-dispersed, and that the ZIP model is more appropriate than the ZINB
model. Finally, we compare all four estimated models, following Long and Freese
(2014), based on AIC, BIC, and Vuong test statistics to find the preferred model(s).

We consider that the vaccination decision and resulting number of vaccinated
livestock is associated with socioeconomic variables. According to Raullt and Krebs
(2014), a household’s vaccination decision depends on prior experiences with relevant
outcomes, such as disease occurrence and the degree of severity. The expected cost of
disease avoidance and preventive expenditure are other influencing factors in this
analysis (Chilonda and Van Huylenbroeck 2001). Moreover, the decision is likely
influenced by households’ geographical locations. Under this framework, equation (2)
can be modeled through the following vaccination equation that describes the number of
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vaccinated livestock equation (3), which is influenced by associated factors included in
right-hand side:

(6)

𝐷𝑣 , 𝑉𝑙𝑠 = 𝑓(𝑍𝑒𝑑 , 𝑍𝑐𝑐 , 𝑍ℎ𝑐 ; 𝛽, 𝜀),

where 𝑍𝑒𝑑 is the vector of disease information consisting of livestock illness and death in
the past twelve months; 𝑍𝑐𝑐 is the vector of livestock vaccination and travel costs to
access veterinary services; 𝑍ℎ𝑐 represents the vector of pastoral household's
characteristics. The estimated parameters are captured by 𝛽, the vector of coefficients for
exogenous variable 𝑥, whereas the error term, 𝜀 presents the combined effect of the
omitted variables of the estimation model (Freedman 2005). We also include a dummy
variable as ‘socially and economically active household’ (𝑆&𝐸_𝑑) that has been
constructed from three other variables- household head has at least a primary school
education level, household with at least one wage earner, and household with at least one
cellphone. Equation (6) is the basis of our empirical estimation. Econometric estimation
strategies, presented in chapter 4, are employed to reveal the vaccination equation to test
and predict how socio-economic and behavioral factors affect pastoralists’ vaccination
decisions.
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CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this chapter, we present the variables included in the maximum likelihood and mixture
models (see Table 1), and descriptive statistics of vaccination status in terms of livestock
illness and death. We also present and explain the econometric estimations of the
vaccination decision model and number of vaccinated livestock model with related
discussions followed by robustness checks.

5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 provide a summary overview of the livestock
vaccination status of three ethnic groups who faced disease infection and deaths in the
past twelve months. Even though 49.74% of households have experienced livestock
deaths, only 10.71% vaccinated their livestock in the study areas. A higher percentage of
the households experiencing livestock disease—compared to households not
experiencing disease—vaccinated their livestock, which is uniform across the ethnic
groups. The percentage of vaccination is lower, around 11% of studied households, for
households that experienced more livestock deaths than their counterparts. We also find
that a higher percentage of pastoralists did not vaccinate their livestock who experienced
livestock deaths. The difference is small, but a slightly higher percentage of pastoralists
who experienced livestock illness vaccinated their livestock than those who experienced
livestock deaths. However, a Pearson chi-square test shows that the difference is not
significant among the ethnic groups. The ratio of vaccinating and not-vaccinating
households shows the same pattern for the pastoralist who experienced both livestock
illness and death simultaneously.
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5.2 Econometric Results
We report the results from both maximum likelihood estimations for pastoralists’
averting decision and mixture models for the number of vaccinated livestock. All full
reported models presented in this chapter include a wage earner dummy, and a socially
and economically active household dummy to account for the extra monetary income and
social heterogeneity in terms of livestock assets.

First, we report the results of maximum likelihood estimations to check the
factors affecting vaccination decision in table 3. Furthermore, we compute essential
model fit indicators to compare the relative quality of all estimated models and to reveal a
parsimonious and robust model following Long and Freese’s (2014) procedure. We find
that the results from a penalized logit and bias corrected logit are more appropriate from
theoretical and econometric backgrounds, although we also report standard logit and
probit estimations for comparison. As the coefficients of maximum likelihood
estimations are not easily explainable, we calculate the marginal effects to measure the
instantaneous rate of change of continuous variables and discrete change of dummy
variables, respectively. Moreover, we also compare the results of hurdle mixture models
that predict the vaccination decision. In every case, the magnitude and level of
significance are found to be quite similar.

Table 3 and part 2 of table 4 show that the marginal effect of illness incidence on
vaccination decision is positive and significant at the 1% level. We also find a
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statistically significant difference in the means of the number of illness incidents between
vaccinating (21.112) and not-vaccinating (9.382) groups of pastoralist. This result
supports our initial conjecture and hypothesis that states that experienced livestock illness
events influence pastoralists to decide to vaccinate their livestock. This result also
corresponds to theoretical evidence on decision under actual risk components provided
by Dijkhuizen et al. (1994); Fox et al. (2007), Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and
experimental evidence cited in Chilonda and Huylenbroeck (2001). Additionally, we find
the impact of the number of dead livestock is not statistically significant in our specified
model, and the mean difference, reported in table 1, is also insignificant for both
vaccinated (15.085) and not-vaccinated (10.113) groups of pastoralist. Therefore, we do
not find support for the hypothesis that livestock deaths increase the number of livestock
vaccinated.

It is sometimes argued that monetary income such as wage earnings from family
members positively affects the probability that households take measures to avoid risky
events. In this study, we find that having at least one wage earner has a positive and
significant impact on the vaccination decision. Moreover, pastoral households who are
socially and economically active are more likely to vaccinate their livestock, which is
significant at the 10% level. Across the study area, pastoralists who are educated,
financially able and may have better access to information are more likely vaccinate their
livestock. This is also consistent with empirical evidence obtained in the study by
Covarrubias et al. (2012).
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On the other hand, we also observe that higher per capita livestock has negative
and significant impacts on vaccination decision at 1% level. The result simply conveys
that pastoralist households owning a higher number of livestock per family member are
less likely vaccinate their livestock. Though it seems counterintuitive, there are a few
potential explanations. Pastoralists with higher livestock per capita have more options to
either sell sick livestock in nearby markets or eat at home to minimize disease risk and
consequent deaths. Given that livestock represent a store of wealth, it may represent a
decreasing marginal utility of wealth. Risk attitudes may also change with wealth level,
but in practice, eliciting risk attitude under a certain circumstances determined
exogenously. We therefore need to make assumptions on the possibility of different risk
attitudes of pastoralists in view of livestock diseases incidences and death. Vaccination
cost also has a negative impact on averting decisions. When the price of a vaccine is
higher, households are less likely to vaccinate. We also compute related model fit
indicators for all four estimations. Finally, the predicted probabilities do not change much
across the models.

Table 4 presents the marginal effects of the mixture models in two separate but
consecutive parts. First we consider the estimations of predicting the vaccination decision
for hurdle models, and excess zero group of the zero inflated models. Then we consider
the results of the model of the number of vaccinated livestock. Results reported in part 2
of zero-inflated models determine whether the observed count is zero. It indicates that
socially and economically active pastoralists are less likely to be in the always zero
group. Additionally, pastoralists who experienced higher incidences of livestock illness
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and resided comparatively far from the livestock extension offices are less likely than
their counterparts to be in always zero group. Conversely, the higher the vaccination cost,
the more likely the household is in excess zero group.

Considering zero inflated models, we know that pastoralists who are not in the
excess zero group, have decided to vaccinate have at least few vaccinated livestock. So,
we compare the findings revealed from the two variants of hurdle and zero-inflated
models that predicts the number of vaccinated livestock (see part 1 of table 4). The
number of vaccinated livestock is influenced positively by the number of livestock
illnesses experienced by the household in the past twelve months. This may be because
pastoralists feel more risk of losing their livestock asset when they face frequent
incidences of illness. Moreover, the predicted probability of vaccinated livestock is
higher for the pastoralist who has at least one wage earner. Monetary income, especially
from wage earners, increases the financial ability to vaccinate more livestock to cope
with future disease risks. We further find that higher vaccination costs increase the
number of vaccinated livestock.

We also find that a few variables in the model have significantly negative impacts
on the predicted number of vaccinated livestock. Both Poisson and negative binomial
variants of hurdle and zero-inflated model reveal similar predictions. As per part 1 of
table 4, household head older than 30 years have less vaccinated livestock than their
counterparts. The estimated coefficient of the dummy variable for socially and
economically active households is negative and significant at the 10% level. More active
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households would have fewer vaccinated livestock compared to those who are not active.
The most justified explanation of this finding-they know alternative options to cope or
minimize the diseases incidences and severity. Moreover, households that experienced
more livestock death have a significantly lower number of vaccinated livestock. In
addition, we only find significant marginal effects in case of Poisson estimations for per
capita livestock and travel cost dummy. However, negative binomial estimations predict
statistically insignificant marginal effects that indicate a lower level of robustness to
generalize the impacts of the variables in determining the number of vaccinated livestock.

5.3 Robustness Check
In both discrete choice and count data models, estimations related to livestock deaths are
not significant, and vaccination cost contradicts the predictions of conventional theories.
Moreover, few marginal effects of both components of mixture models show same
direction which is opposite in general. All these queries require further investigation
through several robustness checks.

As a part of post-estimation robustness checks, we estimate both models under
different specification that includes the set of covariates regarding households’ prior
disease experience, vaccination and travel cost, and household characteristics
successively to check the consistency. Following Barslund (2007), we consider disease
information as a set of core variables, and others as the set of non-core covariates. In
every step, we find consistent results with a few exceptions. Further, we also estimated
other variants of the hurdle model, reported in Table 4 including Poisson-bias corrected
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logit, Poisson-penalized logit, negative binomial-bias corrected logit, and the negative
binomial-penalized logit due to the presence of excessive zeros. We also calculate the
predicted probabilities of all estimated models that do not meaningfully change.
Moreover, we run regressions on data that pool data for the three ethnic groups together.
In most cases, we find similar results in terms of relationship, magnitude and significance
level for every alternative data specifications, except for the Barabaig ethnic group. We,
then, perform Hausman (1978) specification test by controlling ex-post disease
information, cost lines, and household’s characteristics to check the consistency and
conditional heterogeneity. We additionally compute all models with robust standard
errors to reduce any heteroskedasticity incidence following Cameron and Trivedi (2009).
These estimations confirm the robustness of main results in table 2, 3 and 4. The detail
results are not reported in the main text, but codes are available in respective Stata dofile.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Vaccination is a key tool for livestock disease risk management (Keeling et al. 2003), but
little is known about what factors drive pastoralists’ vaccination choices. This study
contributes to the existing literature in several ways. We used primary data generated
from surveys with pastoralists in the Iringa region of Tanzania, and analyzed householdlevel as well as community-level information to address two of our general research
questions on the factors influencing the vaccination decision. We employed multiple
empirical procedures to explore the robustness of pastoralists’ vaccination decisions and
number of vaccinated livestock given livestock diseases and deaths experienced in the
last twelve months and other economic, social and behavioral variables.

We find that pastoralist households that are socially and economically active and
have at least one wage earner are more likely to decide to vaccinate their livestock.
Moreover, the occurrence of livestock illness also has a significant positive impact on
averting decision. We also find consistent results from a few variants of mixture models,
for example hurdle and zero-inflated models where the same set of variables predicts that
pastoralists are less likely to be in the excess zero class. We further find that a high
prevalence of livestock illness, higher vaccination cost, and wage earners in the
household are positively related to the number of vaccinated livestock. On the contrary,
higher numbers of dead livestock due to diseases, high travel cost in terms of distance
from extension offices, and households with older heads of household have significantly
lower number of vaccinated livestock.
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Finally, we propose a few lessons relevant to policy based on our findings. First,
lowering the cost of vaccination would likely increase pastoralist’s vaccination decision.
As proposed by McLeod and Rushton (2007), a vaccination support program would be
helpful for low-income pastoralists. Second, government and NGOs can invest in
frequent and extensive livestock health education and management, training, and
infrastructure, which would be beneficial for both pastoralist households and extension
officers (Allport et al. 2005; Perry et al. 2013). Though pastoralists have traditional
knowledge, training on emerging diseases and treatments should positively influence
vaccination uptake. Third, infrastructure development for vaccination support programs
and convenient delivery systems are essential to help low-income pastoralists (Mazet et
al. 2009). Currently there are no commercial veterinarians or dispensaries operating in
many rural parts of Tanzania, even though the Tanzanian government intended to phase
out government veterinary services (except in the case of public goods) in favor of
private practices over a decade ago (Gustafson et al. 2015). Fourth, convenient access to
information (e.g., veterinary services, market price) through mobile phones would
increase the awareness of disease, treatment options, and vaccination decisions. In this
respect, Wolf (2005) suggests the same.

Our study considers static-type models based on cross-sectional data. We are
therefore unable to provide dynamic explanations of the decision-making process of
pastoralists on livestock assets and disease risk management, where an appropriate panel
study can reveal time-dependent changes. Moreover, this exercise does not capture
spatial elements that may be relevant. Future research can address these shortcomings.
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Appendices
Table 1. Description of Model Variables
Variable

Description

Dependent variables
Indicator variable of livestock vaccination status (1 if vaccinated, 0 if
𝑣𝑎𝑐_𝑙𝑠_𝑑
not)
Number of vaccinated livestock (in TLU) in the past 12 months
𝑣𝑎𝑐_𝑙𝑠
Ex-post diseases information
Number of livestock’s ill incidence in the past 12 months
𝑖𝑙𝑙_𝑙𝑠
Number of died livestock (in TLU) in the past 12 months
𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑑_𝑙𝑠
Per capita livestock (in TLU)
𝑝𝑐𝑙𝑠
Costs of vaccination
Vaccination cost (in TZS) for infected livestock
𝑣𝑎𝑐_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑑 Indicator variable of travel cost of vaccination (1 if distance is medium
to high, 0 if none to low)

Livestock vaccination status
Vaccinated
Not vaccinated
̅
𝑋(𝑠𝑑)
𝑋̅(𝑠𝑑)

Pooled
𝑋̅(𝑠𝑑)

-

-

0.107(0.310)

162.933***(437.377)

0.000(0.000)

17.457(148.906)

21.111***(44.488)
15.085(29.669)
14.284***(47.906)

9.382(9.208)
10.113(14.440)
4.251(5.087)

10.639(17.084)
10.645(16.695)
5.326(16.376)

3.97e+7(2.02e+7)
3.333*(0.967)

1.61e+7(1.2e+6)
2.823(1.138)

1.86e+7(3.46e+7)
2.878(1.130)

Household characteristics
0.810(0.402)
0.777(0.417)
𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝_𝑑 Indicator variable of household (HH) head’s age (1 if HH head’s age
more than 30 years, 0 if unknown and less than 30)
Indicator variable of household’s wage earners (1 if HH has at least one
0.190**(0.402)
0.051(0.222)
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑑
wage earner, 0 if not)
Indicator variable of socially and economically active household (1 if
0.190**(0.402)
0.057(0.233)
𝑆&𝐸_𝑑
primary educated HH head with at least one cellphone has extra
earnings from different sources like wage labor, remittance, selling
cultural goods, 0 otherwise)
Notes: ***, ** and * represents the level of significant at 1%, 5% and 10% of the t-test for equality of means of the vaccinated and non-

0.781(0.415)
0.066(0.249)
0.071(0.258)

vaccinated pastoralist household.
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Table 2. Ex-post Livestock Diseases and Vaccination Status
Livestock’s illness incidence
Experienced
Not experienced
Vaccinate
Not
Vaccinate
Not
vaccinated
vaccinated
Barabaig
6.00
35.00
0.00
1.00
(18.60)
(81.40)
(0.00)
(100.00)
Massai
12.00
109.00
0.00
1.00
(9.92)
(90.08)
(0.00)
(100.00)
Sukuma
1.00
29.00
0.00
0.00
(3.33)
(96.67)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Total
21.00
173.00
0.00
2.00
(10.82)
(89.18)
(0.00)
(100.00)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are percentage of household.
Ethnic
group

Pearson
χ2
(p-value)
0.227
(0.633)
0.110
(0.740)
0.243
(0.622)

Livestock’s death
Experienced
Not experienced
Vaccinate
Not
Vaccinate
Not
vaccinated
vaccinated
5.00
16.00
3.00
20.00
(23.81)
(76.19)
(13.04)
(86.96)
6.00
54.00
6.00
56.00
(10.00)
(90.00)
(9.68)
(90.32)
0.00
17.00
1.00
12.00
(0.00)
(100.00)
(7.69)
(92.31)
11.00
87.00
10.00
88.00
(10.20)
(88.78)
(10.20)
(89.90)

Pearson
χ2
(p-value)
0.855
(0.355)
0.004
(0.952)
1.353
(0.245)
0.053
(0.817)

43

Table 3. Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Estimations for Pastoralists’ Averting Decisions
Variable

Illness incidence
Dead livestock (in TLU)
Per capita livestock
Vaccination cost (in TZS)
Travel cost dummy
Age group dummy
Wage earner dummy
S&E active HH dummy

Logit

Probit

dy/dx (se)
0.007**(0.003)
0.001(0.001)
-0.002(0.004)
0.058* (0.033)
0.080*(0.044)
0.042(0.047)
0.110**(0.052)
0.105**(0.052)

dy/dx(se)
0.007**(0.003)
0.001(0.001)
-0.002(0.006)
-0.066*(0.040)
0.082*(0.047)
0.050(0.053)
0.129**(0.063)
0.127**(0.063)

Bias Corrected
Logit
dy/dx(se)
0.069(0.045)
0.007(0.010)
-0.216***(0.039)
-0.138(0.409)
0.887(0.635)
0.391(0.602)
1.449**(0.643)
1.407**(0.637)

Penalized
Logit
dy/dx(se)
0.079**(0.035)
0.010(0.011)
-0.044*(0.027)
-0.705*(0.397)
0.957(0.631)
0.465(0.622)
1.495**(0.656)
1.450**(0.666)

Log likelihood
-55.349
-55.363
-38.972
22.55
22.52
LR 𝜒 2
2
19.78 (0.011)
Wald 𝜒
2
2
0.169(0.004)
0.169(0.004)
Pseudo 𝑅 (p>𝜒 )
Sample size
195
195
195
195
Notes: ‘dy/dx’ and ‘se’ indicates marginal effect after regression and standard error, respectively. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001.
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Table 4. Marginal Effects of Mixture Models for No. of Vaccinated Livestock by Pastoralist
Variable

Poisson-Logit
Hurdle
(PLH)
dy/dx (se)
Part 2: Predicting number of vaccinated livestock (count data)
Illness incidence
0.011**(0.005)
Dead livestock (in TLU)
-0.010***(0.001)
Per capita livestock
-0.002***(0.003)
Vaccination cost (in TZS)
0.711***(0.094)
Travel cost dummy
-0.327***(0.136)
Age group dummy
-0.923***(0.075)
Wage earner dummy
0.724***(0.080)
S&E active HH dummy
-0.302***(0.109)

Negative BinomialLogit Hurdle
(NBH)
dy/dx (se)

Zero-Inflated
Negative
Binomial (ZINB)
dy/dx (se)

Zero-Inflated
Poisson
(ZIP)
dy/dx (se)

0.014(.011)
-0.009***(0.003)
-0.003(0.008)
0.622***(0.159)
-0.285(0.240)
-0.976(0.216)
0.640***(0.203)
-0.225***(0.230)

0.014(0.011)
-0.009**(0.003)
-0.003(0.008)
0.621***(0.159)
-0.285(0.240)
-0.976***(0.216)
0.639**(0.203)
-0.224(0.229)

0.011**(0.011)
-0.010***(0.001)
-0.002(0.003)
0.711***(0.094)
-0.327***(0.136)
-0.923***(0.075)
0.724***(0.080)
-0.301***(0.109)

-0.086**(0.039)
-0.013(0.013)
0.029(0.058)
0.814*(0.445)
-1.131*(0.683)
-0.591(-0.669)
-1.561**(0.708)
-1.491**(0.709)

-0.086**(0.039)
-0.013(0.012)
0.029(0.058)
0.815***(0.445)
-1.131***(0.683)
-0.591(0.669)
-1.561**(0.708)
-1.491**(0.709)

Part 1: Predicting vaccination decision (for PLH, NBH) and excess zeros (for ZIP, ZINB)
Illness incidence
0.086**(0.039)
0.085**(0.039)
Dead livestock (in TLU)
0.013(0.012)
0.013(0.013)
Per capita livestock
-0.029(0.058)
-0.029(0.058)
Vaccination cost (in TZS)
-0.814*(0.445)
-0.814*(0.445)
Travel cost dummy
1.131*(0.683)
1.131*(0.683)
Age group dummy
0.591(0.669)
0.591(0.669)
Wage earner dummy
1.561**(0.708)
1.561**(0.708)
S&E active HH dummy
1.490**(0.709)
1.490**(0.709)

/lnalpha
-2.512***(0.570)
-2.513***(0.570)
alpha
0.081(0.046)
Nonzero observations
21
21
21
Log likelihood
-142.997
-141.430
-141.437
-143.005
64.760
10038.470(0.000)
LR 𝜒 2
2
16.200 (0.0400)
16.200(0.400)
Wald 𝜒
̅̅̅2 )
3.140(0.038)
LR Test (𝜒
3.540(0.000)
4.410(0.000)
𝑧(𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙) of Voung Test
Sample size
195
195
195
195
Notes: ‘dy/dx’ and ‘se’ indicates marginal effect after regression and standard error, respectively. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001.
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